The European System for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights
Neri Sybesma-Knol*
Let me begin by saying how very privileged I feel to be here today
and to have been invited to speak to you on the significance of the
European Human Rights protection system. One preliminary remark
I must make is that a library of books has been written on the
European Convention. One has a feeling that it has become almost
impossible to say anything original on this subject.' I could cite at
least thirty-five distinguished authorities for almost everything I will
be saying. Therefore, I will limit myself today to pointing out some
of the main characteristics of the European system. Hopefully, this
might be of use to American lawyers who would like to find out
2
what a regional system can do to a country!
First, I will discuss the significance, or, may I say, the justification,
of regional systems, as opposed to the global, United Nations approach, for the protection of human rights. Second, I will look into
the very special circumstances surrounding the creation of the Council
of Europe and the so-called "Strasbourg system." Third, I would
like to outline the most important characteristics of the Strasbourg
system. These include: the guarantees it provides, its jurisdictional
and evolutive character, and the influence it has on the national law
of the member states. Last, I will address, very briefly, the question

Professor of Law, School of Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.
Out of the number of documents, books, and articles consulted I will mention
only some, for direct references, in the footnotes. Excellent bibliographical information, as well as information on procedures and in case law, is provided by the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg: European Convention, 8 Protocols, Rules of
Procedure of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights;
Publications of the European Court of Human Rights (Series A contains decisions
and judgments, Series B contains pleadings, oral arguments and documents); Yearbooks of the European Convention on Human Rights; Activities of the Council of
Europe in the Field of Human Rights (annual survey); and Stocktaking on the
European Convention on Human Rights (a periodic survey).
2 So far, there has been no serious consideration given to possible United States
accession to the European System. But see Sohn, Problems Involved in Opening
the European Convention on Human Rights to the Accession by the United States
and Canada, in A. ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 353-55 (1968) [hereinafter ROBERTSON].
*
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of human rights protection in the framework of the European Community, as well as in the framework of the Helsinki Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We cannot,
and may not, ignore the new developments in Europe and the myriad
of questions they seem to provoke, every day now, for European
policy-makers and lawyers.
I.

REGIONALISM VERSUS UNIVERSALISM

We know, and we have been reminded of it again both yesterday
and today, how the end of World War II marked a new era in the
protection of human rights. The adoption of the Universal Declaration
by the General Assembly in 1948 really marked this new beginning.
It did so in two very important but, I submit, fundamentally different
ways. On the one hand, it recognized for the first time that respect
for human rights by governments is not only of national but also
of international concern; that there is a link between international
peace and security and the way governments treat human beings
under their jurisdiction;3 and that there should be a system of international accountability for a government's behavior. This concerns
the creation of an international machinery for the protection of human
rights.
On the other hand, the Declaration did recognize, for the first
time, the universality of human rights. This means that those rights
are inherent to every human being, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion. In my opinion, of these two achievements,
the latter is at least as important as the former, and both elements
should be taken into account in the debate concerning regionalism
versus universalism in the protection of human rights.
Of course, far-reaching regional implementation systems may well
serve the cause of human rights. Governments may experience profound embarrassment at the mere thought of international concern
or judgment, especially by a friendly or neighboring state. Regional
systems may well function as a catalyst for other regional ventures,
especially where a universal system is not yet in operation.
But the "promotion" of regional protection systems cannot mean
that there are people in this world with better defined or more
sophisticated rights than others. It cannot stand for the notion that

I See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III) (1948),
Preamble, para. 1.
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human rights are for some people only or that they are related to
culture, race, religion, language, and custom as a "basic common
denominator." ' 4 This kind of regionalism would be in direct contradiction with the "Universal" in the Universal Declaration and it has,
rightly I think, been called "extraordinarily disquieting and disturbing,
. . . an alarming attempt at the fragmentation of the international
action to promote human rights, an artificial creation of parochialism
under the pseudonym of regionalism. ..".5
Only exceptional circumstances could justify such a violation of
the principle of universality. Apparently, in 1950, the case of Western
Europe was very special. The European concern with human rights
originated directly from what happened in Europe during the Second
World War and from a fear of communist expansion into Western
Europe. Safeguarding the most essential democratic freedoms became
the first goal of a wider European cooperation as laid down in the
Constitution of the Council of Europe. Having been instrumental in
the drafting of the Universal Declaration, and in anticipation of the
creation of a full-fledged implementation system within the United
Nations (which finally entered into force only in 1976, twenty-eight
years later!), 6 Europe set out to establish its own implementation
system.
Thus, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed in Rome on November

R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW
POLICY 328 (1979) ("Perhaps the most successful way to implement human
rights would be on the regional level, where the member states would have a basic
common denominator of at least geography, if not race, religion, language and
customs'').
4

AND

I Schwelb, The Protection of Human Rights within the Framework of Existing
Regional Organizations, in Robertson, supra note 2, at 330-42, 355-56 (commenting
on the report of J. Lalive); see also id. at 358 (comments by C.W. van Santen,
member of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights) ("the point to be made
in any propaganda for the Strasbourg achievement should be its more extensive legal
force and its enforcement machinery, not its regional character. ..").
6 From the beginning, it had been the intention to create, within the framework
of the United Nations, an "International Bill of Human Rights" with its own
implementation and control mechanisms. Due to several circumstances (the problem
of civil and political rights versus economic, social and cultural rights, and the
problem of collective versus individual rights) it was not until 1966 that the General
Assembly was able to adopt the two Conventions: the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (CCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200 A (XXI) (1966). Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a
"Committee on Human Rights" was to receive inter-state complaints and also
individual petitions, but only with regard to states which had ratified a special
Optional Protocol. The Covenants and the Protocol entered into force in 1976.
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4, 1950, and entered into force in 1953. 7 Currently, all twenty-three
members of the Council of Europe are parties to the Convention,
except Finland which has so far only signed it. The twenty-two states
have also recognized, by express declaration, the competence of the
organs under the Convention to receive petitions from persons, groups

of individuals, or non-governmental organizations.8
II.

A.

THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRASBOURG

SYSTEM

The Guarantees

The Convention indicates that the relationship between the Universal Declaration and the aim of the Council of Europe is in "securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the
Rights of the Declaration by taking the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of these rights." 9 We have already touched
upon the two basic points of departure. The European Convention
does not protect all of the rights enumerated in and protected by
the Declaration. Only those rights capable of direct application are
included. Thus, economic, social and cultural rights are excluded.10
In addition, some fundamental rights such as ownership of property,
freedom of movement, asylum from persecution, right to participate
in government and public life, and the right to universal suffrage by
secret ballot are not mentioned in the original text of the Convention. 11
On the other hand, defining the rights less generously than in the
United Nations texts made it possible to offer more tangible guarantees to individuals by way of quasi-jurisdictional control by a
Commission and a Court of Human Rights.
B.

The Implementation System

Time does not allow me to go into great detail over the procedures
of the Strasbourg system. In short, it proceeds as follows: the
individual 2 communicates a complaint to the Secretary-General of
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
s COUNCIL OF EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

13-14

(1989).
9 European Convention, supra note 7, Preamble.
,0Later, a separate Social Charter was drawn up in the Council of Europe. See
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35 (its supervisory machinery however is much less effective than that of the Convention).
1 Some of these rights have been incorporated into the Convention's system by
separate protocols. See infra, § D.
,2See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 25, at 236 (parties may declare
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the Council of Europe, who forwards it to the European Commission
of Human Rights. The Commission" is an organ of inquiry and
conciliation. It determines the admissability of the complaint, contacts
the state in question in order to obtain explanations and clarifications,
and tries to secure a friendly settlement.
If a settlement proves impossible, the Commission drafts a final
report on the facts and states its opinion as to whether these constitute
a breach by the state concerned. The Commission's report is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, a
political decision-making body, which decides whether there has indeed been a violation of the Convention. It then prescribes certain
measures to be taken by the state concerned within a certain period
of time. The Committee's decision is binding.
However, within a period of three months after the date of the
transmission of the report, the Commission or the state concerned
may refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The
Court is a judicial decision-making organ. It pronounces judgment
14
which is binding upon the states.
C.

The Right of Individual Complaint
According to the rules of procedure of the Court, the individual
who has lodged the complaint is not a party. Only the Commission
and the state concerned appear before the Court. It is true that since
the 1983 amendment to the Rules of Court, the individual may be
asked to present his case in person. However, an individual still may
not institute proceedings before the Court.
One of the main achievements of the Strasbourg system has been
the importance it has given to the right of individual complaint. In
its efforts to promote human rights it has "made use" of the individual to an extent which has so far only been possible in regional
systems but has now become a guiding principle for every international
human rights implementation system.
that they recognize the competence of the Commission to receive petitions "from
any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set
forth in this Convention").
These Declarations may be for a limited duration, and may be renewed, or be
of an unlimited duration. However, reservations ratione materiae are not allowed.
Id.

3 Each of the 22 Member States have the right to nominate a member of the
Commission. It need not be a national of that state. For example, Liechtenstein
nominated a Canadian national, Professor R. St. Mac Donald.
4 See M. Eissen, La Cour Europenne des Droits de I'Homme, in 5 BULL. DE
L'Ass. POUR LA FIoLITE A LA PENStE DU PRtSIDENT RENt CASSIN 13 (Oct. 1983).
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Why is this right of individual petition so crucial for the implementation of human rights? Is it because this is the only way in
which a victim may secure redress, rehabilitation, or reinstatement
of his rights? Of course not! The concern of international human
rights far exceeds the interests of the single human being or of the
single case. However, the individual's role and cooperation has become indispensable.
The victim is "utilized" as a source (or, in the case of "patterns
of gross violations," as sources) of firsthand information. Who else
is going to provide that information? Certainly not the guilty state!
Furthermore, in presenting the details of his case, the individual
provides the international machinery with the opportunity to define
a specific problem in direct terms. No excuse exists for clothing
accusations in politically vague and evasive wording. The problem is
there in writing, the circumstances of the case must be looked into
by the state concerned, and explanations may be demanded! Finally,
the cooperation of the individual makes it possible to deal with a
certain problem in a jurisdictional way. This is important because it
provides the proper international body with the opportunity, given
the facts and the legal issues, to pronounce judgment with all the
ensuing international legal consequences for the state concerned.
The right of individual complaint is the heart of international
human rights protection because the influence of the findings of a
court or another international body far exceeds the individual case.
The European Court has recognized this in a number of cases, stating
that "[t]he Court's judgments . . . serve not only to decide those
cases brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate,
safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention,. .""

,1Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
154 (1978).
For a discussion of this case see infra, § E.
In an earlier decision, the Court decided to strike the case off its docket because,
while the case was before the Court, Belgium had amended its legislation on the
point in question. See De Becker v. Belgium, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1962).
Consequently, the Court found that the question whether De Becker had been the
victim of a violation of the Convention had become one of "historical interest."
However, one judge found that
...This question could have been answered in the positive if the function
of the Court had been to enforce private claims, which a claimant may,
if he wishes, modify during proceedings. According to the Convention, the
function of the Court is to ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention (Art.
19) .. .The Commission may bring the question for final decision before
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Therefore, I do not agree with the opinion, so often expressed in
the past, that the right of individual petition is a "European belief."
The right of individual petition is the cornerstone of human rights
protection everywhere. In any case, recent developments and experience within the United Nations system, with the recognition of the
right of petition in several treaties and by ECOSOC Resolution 1503,
support this view.
6
D. The Evolutive Characterof the Strasbourg System1
One of the most significant and, to some member states, disquieting
aspects of the European system is its evolutive character. This evo7
lution has taken a variety of forms. First, several additional protocols
have added various rights to the scope of the Convention. For instance, the right to "peaceful enjoyment of possession "18 and the
right to education 9 have been added to the overall number of rights.
Other rights include the addition of "horizontal protection" for
women in the private atmosphere, 20 the obligation to hold secret
22
ballots at regular intervals, 21 and the abolition of the death penalty.

Second, and even more important because an individual state has
little or no control over this, it has been through the interpretation

the Committee of Ministers or before the Court. When the proceedings
have gone that far, the public interest requires that the question whether
a violation has or has not taken place shall be decided regardless of whether
the applicant is or is not interested in the continuance of the proceedings.
Id. at 6 (Ross, J., dissenting).
The Court itself has followed this line of reasoning. See Guzzardi Case, 39 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980) ("proceedings under the Convention frequently serve a
declaratory purpose.

.

."); Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) ("the

substance of the issue before the Court, namely whether judicial corporal punishment
as inflicted on the applicant in accordance with Manx legislation is contrary to the
Convention...").
16See generally J. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1988).
,1By the end of 1989 eight additional Protocols had been adopted. Some of

them have been incorporated into the text of the Convention (Third and Fifth
Protocol), some added certain rights and freedoms to the ones already protected
(First, Fourth, and Seventh Protocols), one granted the Court the competence to
give advisory opinions (Second Protocol), one concerned procedural matters (Eighth
Protocol) and one abolished the death penalty (Sixth Protocol).
" Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
19Id., art. 2.
20 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, art. 5.
11Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 264 (yet universal
suffrage was not granted).
22 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention, 1983 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HuM. RTS. (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 1.
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of the Convention by the Commission or by the Court that a certain
evolution has occurred. Because the European system may, in a unique
way, encroach on member states' domestic jurisdiction, it has been
argued that the Convention requires a most cautious interpretation.
Thus, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion in the Golder
case, one of his many separate or dissenting opinions, was of the
opinion that this:
• . . could justify even a somewhat restrictive interpretation of the

Convention, but without going as far as that, they must be said
unquestionably not only to justify, but positively to demand, a
cautious and conservative interpretation, particularly .

.

. where ex-

tensive construction might have the effect of imposing upon the
contracting States obligations they had not really meant to 23assume,
or would not have understood themselves to be assuming.
The Court itself, however, has, with varying degrees of emphasis,
generally adopted an activist approach towards the Convention. The
most outspoken statements expressing judicial restraint figure in dissenting opinions. The Court has consistently stressed the overall
importance of the main purpose of the Convention as laid down in
the Preamble, "the maintenance and further realization of Human
Rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 24 It has sought "effective interpretation" as a means to further this purpose and it has done so by
way of what it has called "autonomous interpretation."
The Court first employed this interpretation by stating that "the
right of access constitutes an element which is inherent in the right
stated in Article 6(1)."25 Moreover, "this is not an extensive interpretation forcing new obligations on the Contracting States . . . but
[is] . . . based on the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6(1)

read in its context and having regard to the object and purpose of
the Convention. ' 26 The second instance concerned torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. The question was "whether the
Commission and the Court would be able to look beyond the particular conceptions of 1950 and take into account contemporary
ideas." The Court had to recall that "the Convention is a living
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be in-

23
24
25
26

Golder Case 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39 (1975).
European Convention, supra note 7, Preamble, at 2.
36 (1975).
Golder Case, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at
Id.
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terpreted in the light of present-day conditions. ' 27 Thereafter, the
Court considered a narrow interpretation of the exceptions provided
for in the Convention Article 8(2). "This paragraph, since it provides
for an exception to a right guaranteed by the Convention, is to be
narrowly interpreted. 28 Finally, ". . . the principle of freedom of
expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be
narrowly interpreted.' '29
Even when a certain interpretation is "dictated" by the travaux
prparatoires, the Court has sometimes displaced those by other
considerations. In the case of Young, James and Webster, concerning
the closed shop issue, i.e. the right not to belong to a union, the
Court avoided "the message of the travaux which it plainly found
unacceptable." 30 Finally, the Court has departed from the traditional
view of human rights protection as an "obligation to abstain."',
Instead it recognized a positive obligation to guarantee, through
adequate legislation, the various rights and fundamental freedoms
which "...
implies an obligation for the State to act in a manner
S. 32 consistent with the Convention.
The question then arises as to the influence of the Strasbourg
system on the national law of the member states.
E. Influence of the Convention on the Domestic Law of the
Member States
For this purpose, I would like to discuss with you, briefly, two
cases. The first case involved an individual complaint concerning the
status of natural children under Belgian law. Alexandra Marckx was
born in 1973 in Antwerp, Belgium. She is the daughter of Paula
Marckx, a national of Belgium, who was unmarried. Under Belgian
law, there is no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her
child. The maternal affiliation of an "illegitimate" child arises by
means of a voluntary recognition by the mother. However, the establishment of maternal affiliation had only limited effects with regard
to family relationships and inheritance-rights. In principle, it created

27

Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 1 31 (1978).
of Klass and Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 42 (1978).

28 Case

19The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)

65 (1979) (admittedly,

nine dissenting opinions were filed in this case).
30 Young, James and Webster Case, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
analyzed in Merrills, supra note 16, at 86.
3, Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
45 (1978).
32

Id.

51 (1981),
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a bond with the mother alone. The child did not become a member
of his mother's family.
For the mother, if she decided to remain unmarried, the only means
of improving this situation was adoption. However, while creating
certain rights over the adopter's estate, this did not give the child
any rights in intestacy in the estate of the adopter's relatives. Only
legitimation could place an "illegitimate" child on exactly the same
footing as a "legitimate" child. Both of these measures, however,
presupposed the mother's marriage.
The complaint by Paula and Alexandra Marckx concerned not only
the way in which affiliation was established under Belgian law, but
also the question of the child's family relationship and the patrimonial
rights of mother and daughter. Belgian law was, according to the
applicants, in violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the
Convention (the right to respect for family life), Article I of the
First Protocol (the right of peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions),
and Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination).
In its judgment, the Court stated that:
...although ...distinction was traditional ... the Court could
not but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great
majority of the Member States of the Council of Europe has evolved,
and is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the maxim
mater semper certa est.33
Thus, taking into account the evolving position in most European
States, the Court decided that existing Belgian legislation was in
violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. However, the
question remained, since the Court had found certain rules of Belgian
law to be incompatible with the Convention, whether this would mean
that these rules had been so since its entry into force in Belgium
(June 14, 1955).
The Court said no, because "differences of treatment between
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' children, for example in the matter of
patrimonial rights, were for many years regarded as permissible and
normal in a large number of contracting states... Evolution towards

equality has been slow

. .

.. 34

Thus, Belgium was dispensed from

reopening legal acts or situations predating the Court's judgment. In

1d. 41.
58.

34 Id.
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any case, Belgium was under an obligation, from the date of the
judgment, to change its legislation. Notwithstanding the fact that this
took almost ten years, the law in Belgium, de facto, had changed
on the very day of the Court's decision. Notaries and solicitors were
to take this into account when drafting wills and other legal documents. The Courts were also to take this into account. 35
However, the legal effect of a judgment is not limited to the national
jurisdiction of the state concerned. It may have consequences for the
law in the other member states where legislation may also be in
violation of the Convention. For example, with regard to the Marckx
Case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands lost no time and declared
in a judgment of January 18, 1980 that "as the law now stands, no
discrimination nor distinction may be made between legitimate and
illegitimate children." '3 6 A lower court had found in a judgment of
April 17, 1979 (antedating the Marckx Case) that an aunt of an
illegitimate child could not be its guardian because the relevant articles
of the Dutch Civil Code referred only to legitimate children. The
Supreme Court stated that it would apply the Strasbourg judgment
in all cases pending before Dutch courts.3 7
It has been pointed out that this would constitute retroactivity with
regard to the Court's judgment, but as it only was applied to cases
pending, this retroactivity, if at all, was only limited. Nevertheless
it is an illustration of the far-reaching impact of the Strasbourg
system.
This impact also is illustrated by a second case, 38 an inter-state
complaint under Article 24 of the Convention. In 1971, a first complaint was lodged concerning the application of a 1922 "Civil Authorities Act" in August 1971. It involved a "decision to intern
without trial persons suspected of serious terrorist activities but against
whom there was not sufficient evidence to bring court proceedings." 3 9
In 1972, this complaint was withdrawn in the light of an undertaking
by Prime Minister Edward Heath. Meanwhile, use had been made

3 Time does not allow us to deal with the question of direct applicability of
certain provisions of the Convention in the differing legal systems of the member
States, and of the legal effect of the Court's judgments. I must refer to the extensive

national literature on this subject.
36 In re X., 21 NIB 141 (1980), summarized in Barnhoorn, Netherlands Judicial
Decisions Involving Questions of Public Internatiional Law, 1980-81, 13 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT'L L. 363 (1982).
37 Id.
1' Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
39 Id. 36 (a violation of arts. 5 and 6).
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of the "five techniques for in-depth interrogation" on fourteen persons known by name. However, thousands of people were processed
under the Civil Authorities Act. In its complaint, Ireland stated that
detention and internment under Northern Ireland emergency legislation was an "administrative practice" in violation of Articles 5 and
6. However, that under the "methods of treatment of persons in
custody .

.

. interrogation . . . constituted an administrative practice

in breach of Article 3".40
During the proceedings before the Court in 1973, the United Kingdom Attorney-General stated that:
The Government of the United Kingdom have [sic] considered the
question of the use of the 'five techniques' with the very great care
and with particular regard to Article 3 of the Convention. They
now give this unqualified undertaking that the 'five techniques' will
not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation
4
in the United Kingdom. '
Of course, the effect of inter-state complaints is political rather
than legal, but nevertheless may profoundly influence public opinion
and thus, directly and indirectly, a government's policy. In my view,
this is one of the most important aspects of international inquiry
and international findings. It gives to the public, and specifically to
non-governmental organizations (NGO's), of a certain country, a tool
to use in bringing about changes or to put an end to certain human
rights violations. Certainly, representatives of human rights NGO's
should welcome this kind of international criticism and put it to use.
III.

EVALUATION OF THE STRASBOURG SYSTEM

Summing up, briefly, we may conclude that the Strasbourg system
has had a tremendous impact on the evolution and development of
the national law of the member states. It has far exceeded the importance of the various individual cases. It has to a certain extent
contributed to harmonization and integration in Europe. Finally, it
has been so successful that at this moment it is virtually drowning
in its own success. To cite some numbers, while the Court decided
one or two cases (or none at all) per year during the first period of
its activities, or until about 1975, this number began to rise steadily
during the next period (ten cases in 1982) but then more than doubled

-OId. 1 156.
IId. 1 153.
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until it reached the current number of twenty-five per year or more.
Proposals for a re-structuring of the system have been made, and
since the entering into force of the Eighth Protocol on January 1,
1990, some improvements have been made. Eventually, however, a
complete overhaul of the now only semi-permanent and very much
under-staffed system will be necessary.
On the other hand, some have expressed their disappointment over
the direction the European system has taken over the years.
It is abundantly clear (at least it is to me) - and the nature of the
whole background against which the idea of the European Convention on Human Rights was conceived bears out this view - that
the main, if not indeed the sole object and intended sphere of
application of Article 8, was that of what I will call the "domiciliary
protection" of the individual. The individual and his family were
no longer to be subjected to the four o'clock in the morning rata-tat on the door; to domestic intrusions, searches, and questionings;
to examinations, delayings, and confiscation of correspondence; to
the planting of listening devices (bugging); to restrictions on the use
of radio and television; to telephone tapping or disconnection; to
measures of coercion such as cutting off the electricity or water
supply; to such abominations as children being required to report
upon the activities of their parents, and even sometimes the same
for one spouse against another, - in short the whole gamut of fascist
and communist inquisitorial practices such as had scarcely been
known, at least in Western Europe, since the eras of religious
intolerance and oppression, until (ideology replacing religion) they
became prevalent again in many countries between the two world
wars and subsequently. Such, and not the internal, domestic regulation of family relationships, was the object of Article 8, and it
was for the avoidance of these horrors, tyrannies, and vexations
that "private and family life . . . home and . . . correspondence"
were to be respected, and the individual endowed with a right to
enjoy that respect - not for the regulation of the civil status of
42
babies.

IV.

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

At this point, the question may well be asked whether the European
Economic Communities (EEC) would not have a role to play in the

42

Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17 (1978) (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
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regional system for the protection of human rights.4 3 The treaties
establishing the Communities have as their principal goal the creation
of a common market, and not the protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms. Nevertheless, the creation of a common market has
had the effect of extending beyond national frontiers the area over
which the freedoms of the citizen, especially in the economic sector,
may be exercised.
From the beginning, it has been recognized by the Community's
institutions that the individual citizen has certain inviolable rights and
that their protection is an essential element of any democracy. Therefore, they must also be ensured within the framework of the Community's structures. However, even when there has been no uncertainty
over the basic principles, it has been difficult to reach agreement on
their scope and effect.
The European Court of Justice, the Court of the European Communities, which has its seat in Luxemburg, has contributed significantly to the elaboration of certain standards. It has recognized a
number of important general principles of human rights law such as
the principle of proportionality, the requirement of legal certainty,
observance of the right to be heard and to defend one's rights in
legal proceedings, the ne bis in idem principle, and the principle of
non-discrimination.
This has put to rest the concern that citizens within the Community
would be subjected to a new authority bound neither by national
fundamental rights nor by a catalog of fundamental rights at the
Community level. Nevertheless, with the EEC member states now
embarking on a road towards a political union, the question remains
whether the protection of human rights should be incorporated into
the Community's legal order.
This may be achieved in different ways. First, the European Parliament may, and has done so in the past, adopt resolutions with
regard to human rights violations anywhere in the world. Of course,
these resolutions are of a political character. They do not address
the individual's situation nor do they have the binding effect of
judgments or findings of international tribunals.
Second, to make that possible, two possibilities exist. Either draft
a separate catalog of basic rights for the Community or have the
It would be impossible in this context to go into details over European Community organs' activities in the field of Human Rights. I limit myself to this brief
overview, referring interested readers to the vast literature and documentation on
the subject, and more specifically to the case law of the European Court of Justice.
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Community become a party to the Strasbourg system. Both possibilities have their own advantages and disadvantages, as has been
pointed out on numerous occasions in a debate that has been going
on now for more than fifteen years.
Meanwhile, it is not as if Community citizens are deprived of the
protection of any of their fundamental human rights. All of the
member states are now parties to the European Convention, and the
European Court of Justice can, in every case in which a problem of
fundamental rights is raised, be guided by the optimum level of these
rights.
As pointed out before, the Luxemburg Court has done so on
numerous occasions. Furthermore, various separate projects of the
European Commission have led to quite extensive community legislation in the field of economic and social rights on subjects such as
the social situation of migrant workers, equal pay for men and women,
and equality of treatment for men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training, promotion, and working conditions.

V.

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN EUROPE

The question remains whether a separate European system is still
justified after forty years. The answer must be in the affirmative,
but apparently on an altogether different level than the universal
United Nations system. For other systems and regions, the European
system may in some ways serve as a model. It remains a fact that
the great troubles, the "patterns of gross violations", have not been
really "touched" by it.
Therefore, it is my conviction that we also should continue to work
for a wider, more refined, maybe more jurisdictional, system on the
global level of the United Nations. We should also work for an
improved system for the implementation of the United Nations instruments, for more support for the Optional Protocol, and for the
work of the Committee where very important progress has already
been made.
This is why I have read with pleasure that Eastern European
countries have sought the advice of United Nations experts to help
them promote a greater respect for their citizens' human rights. The
countries of the Council of Europe no longer form the countries of
Europe. Things are changing so fast that nobody dares to predict
what is going to happen. As to the role of the Community, its role
in Europe will certainly remain very important. But as of now, there
are other scenarios available which will prove to be more successful,
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at least with regard to human rights protection. One of these scenarios
is that some of the Eastern European countries will seek membership
in the Council of Europe and will accede to the Convention. This
will on the one hand enhance the status and the significance of the
Strasbourg system, but on the other hand concentrate on only some,
admittedly basic, civil and political rights and their jurisdictional
protection.
Another scenario would be that these countries would join the
states which have ratified the United Nations Covenants and Optional
Protocol and are actively participating in the implementation system.
This would enhance the universality, as opposed to the regional
approach, of human rights protection in Europe and it would recognize the principle of indivisibility of civil and political rights, and
economic, social and cultural rights.
However, in the field of human rights there already exists a framework, everybody is desperately searching for frameworks these days,
for pan-European cooperation: the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its follow-up
machinery."
Of course, this Final Act is not a self-contained instrument in which
human rights guarantees are given. It is a formal undertaking by the
signatory states to respect human rights "as laid down in the existing
Human Rights instruments." Even though the Final Act is not itself
a legally binding international agreement, it refers repeatedly to existing international instruments, such as the Charter of the United
Nations and its aims and principles, as well as the United Nations
human rights treaties. Interestingly enough, the Final Act refers also
to General Assembly resolutions such as the Universal Declaration
and the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between
States, which at the time of their adoption were not considered to
have binding force. This reference seems to create a "mutual reinforcement" of both the Final Act and the General Assembly resolutions mentioned here.
- See 73 Dep't St. Bull. 323 (1975). The Helsinki Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe took place from 1973-1975. It was concluded with a session
of Heads of State and Governments of all European States (with the exception of
Albania) and the U.S. and Canada, who signed, on 1 August 1975, the Final Act
of the Conference.
Human Rights questions were included mainly at the request of the United States
and found a place in Part I (a), Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between
Participating States, Principle VII: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
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In any case, the scope and influence of the Final Act depends
upon the political will of the participating states to implement its
principles. This fall, a special conference will be convened for all the
participating states, including the United States and Canada, to discuss
the future of the Helsinki system, and to consider existing proposals
for improvement and fortification of its legal character. It might be
the beginning of a whole new era of human rights protection in
Europe.

